Abstract. Model security for collaborative product development in a networked environment (or called networked manufacturing, grid manufacturing, and cloud manufacturing) is an important and also challenging research issue. An encryption based partial sharing approach for CAD models has been developed and presented in this paper. First, a random invertible decimal matrix to support the encryption approach is proposed, with which parts of a CAD model can be selected flexibly by the model owner for encrypting by different keys; Second, in order to guarantee the security, a dual-key mode and a key based authorization mechanism are proposed. Based on the model, different levels of security are achieved based on different key spaces, and the key based authorization mechanism is used for the model owner to control the partial access of the CAD model flexibly.
Introduction
Collaborative product development (or CPD in the following) is the inevitable development trend [1, 2] . In order to optimize design and manufacturing resources, enterprises have been increasingly developing their products within collaborative value chains in a networked environment. CPD can integrate various cross-regional and cross-enterprise superior resources smartly and dynamically [3, 4] . For instance, using such a CPD approach, a product development task is decomposed into several sub-tasks by an OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer), and the sub-tasks are carried out by different suppliers geographically located. Designers from different enterprises design the product by sharing the product model interactively.
A critical research challenge in CPD is how to ensure the security of CAD model sharing. Product design knowledge is the core-competitiveness of an enterprise, and the design data (e.g., CAD models) con-tain a lot of confidential information (such as design knowledge, design parameters and so on) reflecting the design intent, capacity and capability of the enterprise [5] . Therefore, direct sharing of CAD models during CPD without proper encryption has high risks as follows: (1) The confidential information of design may not be safely kept during the sharing of CAD models; (2) Another critical issue is that if a CAD model is shared to other designers, the reuse and further transmission may be uncontrollable; ( 3) The CAD model data may be captured by unauthorized users when it transformed in the network [6] . As thus, many enterprises are conservative to take the full potential of the Internet to implement CPD though there is a strong need there. As thus, it is imperative to improve the secure sharing of CAD models for CPD.
In CPD, CAD models may be shared frequently among the distributional users [7] . A typical collaboration scenario is as Fig. 1 . In the local site, when a CAD model containing design information is shared, some parts of the CAD model should be protected in different security levels according to the access level of users in the design chain. First, if the part of CAD model is private to its designer, it should be hidden and not shown to all the others (private part); Second, if a part of a CAD model is only shared to an authorized user, it should be hidden and can be set to be accessible by this user (limited public part); Third, if the part of a CAD model is public to each users, it needn't to be hidden (public part). In the remote site, according to the authorization from the CAD model owner, the related second kind of part is recovered, shared and interoperated. The first kind of parts and unauthorized second kind of parts are still hidden.
Based on the above observations, to ensure the security, there are three needs -partial protection of CAD models, different levels of security and flexible authorization mechanism for partial access of CAD models. Some research works have been presented for the secure sharing of CAD models to support CPD. However, there is yet no sound solution to meet the above requirement effectively. In this paper, an approach of encryption based partial sharing of CAD models is presented. The characteristics of this approach includes: (1) A random invertible decimal matrix for partial encryption of a CAD model is proposed. The sketches of the confidential parts are transformed randomly by a random invertible decimal matrix, and the confidential information can be hidden by the shape change related to this confidential part; (2) The encrypting key spaces for different security levels are different; (3) A dualkey mode is proposed for the generation of the encrypting keys, which can improve the security and provide a flexible authorization mechanism for partial access of CAD models.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 includes the related works about the secure sharing of design data in the CPD. Section 3 introduces the architecture for the encryption based partial sharing of CAD models. Section 4 explains the random invertible decimal matrix for the partial encryption method. Section 5 presents the dual-key model for the partial encryption. Section 6 shows a case study, and some conclusions and comparisons are made in Section 7.
Related work
The Internet provides convenience for the information sharing, but simultaneously, also brings the security-risks during sharing. Security-risks have been becoming barriers to implement CPD via the Internet. According to the theory of the information security, there are two main requirements to ensure security during information sharing: (1) Information hiding: a unauthorized user cannot access the confidential information; (2) Information authentication: the information has a verification capacity which can ensure the information has not been changed [8] . Various research works about the secure sharing of CAD models have been developed according to the above two requirements [9] , and the main approaches can by classified in Table 1 . More technical details are expanded below.
Watermark
The "watermark" concept was first proposed by Tirkel [10] . The digital watermarking technology is used for the intellectual property protection and the integrity authentication of the electronic files. The creation information and logo of a creator are embedded in an electronic file in the form of unaware watermark which cannot be removed during sharing, and the watermark can be detected by a special software package [11, 12] . Various watermarking methods were developed for the intellectual property protection of 2D/ 3D CAD models [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . However, in a CPD environment, CAD models are needed to be shared safely, and watermark is not appropriate for sharing design information (design knowledge, parameters and so on) in a secure means. As thus, the design information can still be obtained by other users and a CAD model can be recreated without the watermark relatively easily.
Access control
Access control is an important security method in a networked environment, the access of the special re- source in the networked environment is controlled by a user's authorization. The related works can be classified in the following categories.
The general access control approaches. The access control appeared in the 1970s. Lampson initiated the concept of access matrix, and later the access control became an important approach for information protection in networked environments [24] . Conway used the concept of secure matrix for access control, and standardized the secure matrix and finally presented the theory of discretionary access control [25] . Later, many access control approaches were developed. Based on the experience of the former research, Sandhu proposed a role based access control approach (RBAC96) [26] . Task-role-based Access Control was proposed by OH [27] , and Usage Control called the next generation of access control model was presented [28, 29] .
The access control approaches of files for CPD. In order to support CPD, many special access control approaches were developed. van der Hoeven proposed an access control based CAD architecture [30] , but the access control is still file based. Stevens developed an ADOSX system which can handle CPD between two enterprises, while the system just focuses on the access control of files [31] . Cera developed a secure access control mechanism for 3D models [32] , but the method mainly supports the collaborative view of product models not the full-scale collaborative design. Leong devised a security approach for a distributed product data management system, which combines the Lampson's access matrix and Bell and LaPadula's security labels, and it is still file based [33] .
The sharing space based access control approaches for CPD. Considering the frequent sharing of design data, sharing space based access control methods were proposed, in which a secure sharing space was designed. Bullock developed a space approach for the 2D/3D collaborative environment [34] . Kamel presented a dynamic data sharing and security approach for CPD [35] , and Chang developed the security system for sharing engineering drawings in the sharing space [36] .
The multi-method based access control methods for CPD. In order to improve the security of CPD, multimethod based access control methods were proposed, and some other security methods are combined with the access control to ensure better security. Yao devised a security model of data for collaborative design and management system combining multi security methods with the access control [37] . Chang developed a security system for sharing CAD drawings which used a multi-method approach [38] . Speiera also used a multimethod approach to mitigate product safety and security risks [39] . Hao defined a network security mechanism for the collaborative combined VPN (Virtual Private Network) and access control [40] .
The access control method constructs a secure CPD environment based on the architecture-level, and the evolvement process is shown in Fig. 2 . Unfortunately, all the existed general and special access control approaches used in CPD are file based, and they cannot handle the case that the CAD model contains both confidential information and sharing information.
Multi-level design data sharing based on the multi-resolution models
The multi-resolution model can be used for the secure sharing of partial CAD models. The multiresolution model is an important information simplification and hidden approach.
Multi-resolution mesh model. In the past, a solid model is changed to a mesh model, and then the mesh model is transformed to a multi-resolution mesh model for model simplification [41] . Han proposed a multiresolution modeling approach of CAD models to support collaborative design [42] , Qiu designed a T-Curve based simplification method for CAD models [43] , and Li present a 3D simplification algorithm for distributed visualization [44] . All of the methods are mesh model based. However, a mesh model lacks design information (history, features, parameters and so on) to support interoperation in CPD.
Multi-resolution B-rep, solid and feature modeling. Belaziz provided an analysis tool of a B-rep model, which can delete some features without any complex Boolean operations [45] . Seo proposed a B-rep based multi-resolution modeling method based on the WrapAround [46] ; Kim integrated Wrap-Around, SmoothOut and Thinning to develop a new B-rep based multiresolution modeling method [47] . Lee designed the Progressive Solid Model (PSM) to support the multiresolution solid model [48] . Lee developed a feature based multi-resolution modeling method [49, 50] , which is based on the calculation of the "valid volume".
Combination of the multi-resolution feature model and the access control. Cera combined the multiresolution modeling and access control to realize the access control of multi-level CAD model [51, 52] ; Chu focused on multi-level data sharing based on the multi-LOD (Level of Detail) models in CPD [53, 54] . Li proposed a matrix-based modularization approach for supporting secure collaboration in parametric design [55] .
The multi-level design data sharing based on the multi-resolution models can realize the secure sharing of a partial CAD model in some degrees, and its evolvement process is as Fig. 3 . However, this method is not flexibly enough due to the following limitations: 1) The information hidden is in a total mode; 2) The hidden information cannot be selected by the model owner; 3) The approaches cannot support interoperation freely because the sharing model is not complete.
Data encryption
Data encryption is an important approach for the information hidden in the network. It can ensure that the hidden information cannot be obtained by unauthorized users [56, 57] . In recent years, the encryption methods have been widely used for multi-media data, such as the image encryption. Due to the complexity, there are a few research works about 3D models. Huang proposed a method of encrypting 3D data information with virtual holography [58] . Esam proposed secured sharing approaches for 3D mesh model encryption [59] . Naveen developed an encryption based multi-level data access control for the partial data sharing of the images in the collaborative environment [60] On the other hand, until now, there are few research works about the encryption of CAD models.
Summary of the related work
As discussed earlier, the requirements for sharing CAD models are complex. Based on the above discussion, the existing research works for the secure sharing of design data have following main shortages: 1) Lack of flexible partial protection mechanisms; 2) Lack of the different levels of security; 3) Lack of flexible authorization mechanisms for partial access of CAD models. tion for CAD models, which means that the encrypted parts are decided by a model owner; 2) Different levels of security, i.e., three security levels are proposed and different key spaces are generated for different security levels. 3) Key based authorization mechanism for partial access of CAD models, with which the CAD model owner can authorize other users to access related parts of a CAD model by encrypting keys.
The architecture for the developed approach is shown as Fig. 4 . The kernel of the architecture contains four main components: 1) Partial encryption; 2) Partial decryption; 3) Generation of encrypting keys; 4) Key space Database (DB). In CPD, two types of CAD models are defined as follows. 
Partial encryption
This component is used to encrypt a CAD model partially according to the intention of the model owner. In a local site, before a CAD model is shared, some parts should be partially encrypted to protect the confidential information.
In CPD, the partial secure demand of a CAD model contains the following three cases: 1) The part of a CAD model is private, which can't be shared by the others; 2) The part of a CAD model can be shared by the authorized users; 3) The part of a CAD model is public, which can be shared by all the others. According to the secure demand, three security levels are defined as follow: 
Partial decryption
This component is used to decrypt the shared parts of the CAD model. In the remote site, when a shared CAD model is received, it is decrypted partially according to the authorization from the model owner.
Key space DB
The key space DB stores two key spaces which are matrixes and used to generate the encrypting key. According to the security levels, the two key spaces are given as follows. 
Generation of encrypting key
This component is used to generate the encrypting key. According to the key spaces, two types of keys are defined as follows. 
Random invertible decimal matrix based partial encryption method of the CAD model
According to the fundamental principle of the cryptology, the goal of the cryptology is to prevent the information leakage in the information dissemination. The initial information (plain-text) is transformed to a group of special signs (encryption) which should not be understood by the unauthorized users following some designated rules, and the transformed signs (cipher-text) can just be recovered by the authorized persons (decryption). The authorization means the user gets the decrypting information (key) legally [56, 57] . Nowadays, most of the CAD systems are feature based. As thus, for a CAD model, the partial shape and features contain abundant design knowledge (design semantic, design parameters, etc.) which is confidential to the competitors. Therefore, the partial shape and features are the plaintext of a CAD model needed to be encrypted.
A CAD model is made up of various features in a certain order and structure. The features can be classified according their sketches as follows: The first kind of feature is created based on one or more sketches, and the sketches decide the shape of the feature and finally affect the partial shape of the CAD model directly, such as the extrusion, sweep and so on; The second kind of feature is created without any sketch, and this kind of feature is always dependent on the other features, so its shape is affected by the sketches of the other features indirectly, such as a chamfer, draft and so on. As thus, the encryption of sketches can change the shape and features of CAD models, and the confidential information (such as design parameters, semantics and knowledge) of the CAD model can be hidden effectively.
Encryption of sketch
A sketch is composed by sketch elements (such as line, arc, curve and so on) and constraint elements (such as two parallel lines, a fixed vertex and so on). Therefore, the sketch (S) can be represented as Formula (1)
e i denotes a sketch element of S, and c j denotes a constraint element of S.
The sketch elements contain the design parameters and decide the shape of the sketch, the encryption of the sketch can be achieved by the transformation of the sketch elements, and the sketch elements are the plaintext in the encryption of sketch. Since a constraint limits the change of sketch element but does not decide the shape of the sketch, in order to transform the sketch, the constraint elements should be moved. The sketch without constraint elements can be described as Formula (2)
The shape and parameters of S is the same to those of S. For the encryption of S , the plaintext is
It is known that the sketch elements can be changed by a transition matrix. The encryption of S can be describe as Formula (3)
A is the transition matrix, and m i=1 e i is the ciphertext of S .
Finally, the encryption of S is as Formula (4)
A random invertible matrix is given as the transition matrix. Since the matrix is invertible, the cipher-text can be recovered by the inverse matrix of the transition matrix directly. On the other hand, considering the invertible matrix is random, it is difficult to be cracked. At last, in order to improve the randomness of the matrix and limit the position change of the sketch, the values of the elements in A are in the (−1, 0)∪(0, 1). The transition matrix (A) is defined as follow. 
The encryption algorithm of a sketch is detailed as Algorithm 1. if co s+1 is in a 3D coordination system 8. else if co s+1 is in a 2D coordination system 10. 
Return (S )
An example shown in Fig. 5 is used to illustrate the above algorithm. The CAD model contains a sweep feature (F ), and F contains two sketches {S 1 , S 2 }, in which S 1 is a 2D sketch and S 2 is a 3D sketch. Figure 5(a) is the initial CAD model, Fig. 5(b) is the initial S 1 and Fig. 5(c) is the initial S 2 .
The sketch element set (E 1 _set{}) and the constraint set (C 1 _set{}) of S 1 are as follow: (−27, 30), (−35, 20) ), (line2, (27, 30) , (35, 20) (35, 45) , (22, 40) , (27, 30) 
The sketch element set (E 2 _set{}) and the constraint set (C 2 _set{}) of S 2 are as follow: The decryption is the inverse process of the random invertible decimal matrix based encryption. The detail of the decryption algorithm of sketch is as Algorithm 2.
Partial encryption algorithm of CAD models
The CAD model is composed by a group of features, and it can be represented as the Formula (5).
The M denotes a CAD model, F i is the ith feature of M . A feature is generated by the related sketches and parameters in a certain modeling rule. M can be described as the Formula (6). 
else if co s+1 is in a 2D coordination system 9. 
Return (S)
S ij denotes the j th sketch of F i , P ik denotes the k th parameter of F i , and '⊗' denotes the modeling rules. For the CAD model (M ), {F i } n 1 denotes its feature set, and a part of M can be described as {F i } k j , (1 j k n). The CAD model can be also represented as the Formula (7). According to the Formulas (4), (6) and (7), the partial encryption algorithm of a CAD model can be represented as the Formula (8)
c ijr (8) According to the Formula (8), the result of the partial encryption of the CAD model contains two parts, 
Encryption and decryption of single feature
The encryption of the single feature is the basis of the partial encryption of a CAD model, and the detail encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm are as follows. 1. Select the encrypting features interactively:
2. Select the sharing features interactively:
Function:
1. Create the Feature Dependent Graph (FDG) of M 2. The intersecting feature set which can not be encrypted: F _set intersect = NULL 3. The final feature set which can be encrypted:
F _set screen = NULL 4. for (int k = 0; K < m; K + +) { 5. for the feature F whose id is f _share k , retrieve the ids of F 's parent features 6. add the ids in to F _set intersect {} } 7. for (int p = 0; p < n; p + +) 
Screening algorithm of the encrypting features
According to the intention of the CAD model owner, all the features selected should be encrypted. However, sometimes, direct encryption of the selected features may lead to the sharing failure of the other parts, because some selected features may be the parent of the features in the sharing part and the encrypting transformation of the parent features may lead to the shape and position change of the features in a sharing part. In order to ensure the sharing of the other parts without affection, the selected features should be screened.
For the CAD model (M ), according to the dependent relation of the features in M , a Feature Dependent Graph (FDG) can be created (as Fig. 6(a) ). Based on the selected features, sharing features and dependent relations, the features of M can be classified into four parts as follows.
-Selected feature: The features which are selected as candidate encrypted features. In order to maintain the sharing part for other users, the intersecting features should be excluded from the feature set needed to be encrypted. As Fig. 6(b) , the purple shadow region shows the intersection features, meaning the F6 and F8 can not be encrypted. The screening algorithm of the encryption features is as Algorithm 5.
Partial encryption of the CAD model
Because of the dependent relations, the later features may be influenced by the encrypting transformation of the former features. The encrypting order must be from a later feature to the former feature. Based on the Formula (8) and the above algorithms, the partial encryption algorithm of the CAD model is detailed as Algorithm 6. 6. for (int q = 1; q < n; q + +)
Auxiliary file
For the partial encryption of a CAD model, some important information should be stored independently. The information is recorded in an auxiliary file (in this paper, a XML file is used as the auxiliary file). The auxiliary file includes the following three kinds of information.
(1) Basic information: The IDs of source site and the target site (2) Encrypting information: The IDs of the encrypted features and the constraints of the sketches in the encrypted features. (3) Encrypting Key: The Key for this encrypted model Figure 7 shows the example of the auxiliary file.
Time complexity of encryption/decryption
According to the algorithms of sketch encryption/ decryption, if a sketch contains n points, the coordinate transformation is executed for n times in the sketch encryption/decryption, so that the time complexity of the sketch encryption/decryption is O(n).
Because the encryption/decryption of CAD models is based on the encryption/decryption of its sketches, if a CAD model contains m sketches, the sketch en- cryption/decryption is executed for m times. As thus, for the encryption/decryption of CAD models, its time complexity is O(n 2 ).
Generation of the encryption key

Dual-key mode
According to the security principle in the encryption based communication system, in order to prevent cryptanalysis, it needs: 1) The encryption is at least secure in computation; 2) The security of the information relies on the security of the key; 3) The encryption algorithm fits all the elements in the key space. Based on the security principle, a dual-key mode is proposed. The dual-key is made up of the key space and the encrypting key, the encrypting random invertible decimal matrix is generated by the encrypting key space and the key. The Key Space is defined as follow. If a CPD task is initiated, a Public Key Space is generated: KS public . When a new user is added in the task, the KS public is backup locally, and at the same time a Private Key Space is generated locally: KS private .
Before the encryption, the encrypting key is generated from the key space, which is defined as follow.
Definition 11. Encrypting Key
Based on the KS and K, the final random invertible decimal matrix can be generated. The generation algorithms of the encrypting key and matrix are as the Algorithm 8 and Algorithm 9. And the Fig. 8 shows the generation process of the encrypting key and matrix. Algorithm 9. Generation algorithm of encrypting matrix: Matrix_Generation(K) Input:
S S Se e e en n n nt t t t t t t to o o o t t t th h h he e e e o o o ot t t th
1. The encrypting key: K Function: 
Different levels of security
According to the security levels defined above, when a CAD model is partially encrypted, the related key space is selected to generate the encrypting key according to the security level of the related part.
Key based authorization mechanism
In order to control the access of the protected parts flexibly, a key based authorization mechanism is proposed as Fig. 9 .
Before a CAD model is shared, the Private Parts and Limited Public Parts are selected by the model owner, and every part is encrypted by different keys. (1) For the Private Parts, they cannot be decrypted by any other Table 2 Fig . 10 . Collaborative design of a plane engine. users except the model owner, considering the Private Key Space is only kept by the model owner. (2) For one of the Limited Public Parts, if the model owner wants to authorize any user to access it, he/she can send the related key (K) to the user as the authorization, considering the Public Key Space is backup by all the uses in CPD. Any one getting the authorization can decrypt the related Limited Public Part, but the others who do not get the authorization cannot decrypt it. Therefore, the authorization can be controlled flexibly by the model owner based on the encrypting key.
Security analysis
Because of the random invertible matrix based encryption and the dual-key mode, the existing attacks is invalid for the method presented in this paper, the security analysis is detailed as follows.
(1) Because the encryption method proposed in this paper is not based on the periodic matrix but the random invertible decimal matrix, various attack methods for the periodic matrix based transformation of graph are invalid for the encryption method proposed in this paper. (2) Since the encrypting key is generated temporarily when a CAD model is encrypted, the encrypting keys are different each time. The most dangerous "Known Plaintext Attack" and "Chosen Plaintext Attack" for the periodic matrix based transformation of graph are also invalid for the encryption method proposed in this paper. the random invertible decimal matrix cannot be guessed. (4) The encryption method proposed in this paper is based on the dual-key mode, as thus, the encrypted CAD model cannot be decrypted if any one of the Key Space and Encrypting Key is captured by the others. It can guarantee the secure transmission of the encrypted CAD model.
Case study
A real example (based on the SolidWorks 2010) is given as the following to verify the architecture, methods and algorithms presented in this paper.
In this case, there are two distributed sites for an OEM and a Supplier. In the two sites, a plane engine is designed collaboratively. During the process of the collaborative design, the cylinder model created by the supplier should be shared by the OEM, as Fig. 10 .
When the Supplier adds into this task, two Key Spaces are generated as follows: For the supplier, some CAD models of the air cylinder contains important confidential information which is closed to the other designers, and some CAD models of the air cylinder should be shared by the OEM for the assembly analysis, as Fig. 11 .
Both Part 1 and Part 2 contain some Private Information, so they should be encrypted by the Private Key. The generated Encrypting Key and the encrypting matrix of Part 2 are as follows. The partial encryption of the Part 3 is as Fig. 14 .
After the partial encryption of the air cylinder, it is sent to the OEM for sharing as in Fig. 15 . In the supplier the partial encryption doesn't influence the assembly of Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3. When the encrypted model of air cylinder is sent to OEM, the Part 3 is partially decrypted for the assembly analysis, and Part 1 and Part 2 are not partially decrypted for their Private Information.
Conclusion
In this paper, an encryption based partial sharing approach for a CAD model is proposed. The characteristics and contributions of this new approach are summarized as follows:
(1) A random invertible decimal matrix based partial encryption method for a CAD model is proposed. The sketches of the confidential parts are transformed randomly by a random invertible decimal matrix. The confidential information can be hidden by the shape change of the confidential part which is achieved by the transformation of the sketches. Based on this method, the encrypted parts are decided by the model owner flexibly. (2) A dual-key mode is developed for the generation of the encrypting keys. The mechanism can improve the security of the key transmission. Based on the dual-key mode, two key spaces (Private Key Space and Public Key Space) are designed for the different levels of security. Also a flexible key based authorization mechanism for partial access of CAD model is adopted, the model owner can authorize the user to share any Limited Public Part flexibly according to the related encrypting key.
The partial encryption method of an assembly model is proposed as future research topic.
(1) The partial encryption method proposed in this paper is based on the single CAD model. Although the screening algorithm of the encrypting features ensures the successful assembly of the CAD model, partial encryption of the assembly is achieved by the partial encryption of the features one by one. Therefore, a partial encryption method of assembly model should be proposed in future. Based on this method, a group of CAD models in the assembly model can be selected to be encrypted, and the assembly features of every CAD models can be excluded automatically which can ensure the successful assembly of the encrypted CAD models. (2) Different from the single CAD model, the structure of the assembly model is the important information to be protected in the partial sharing of the assembly model, the partial encryption method of assembly model should have the capability of hidden the partial structure of the assembly model.
